Fix Bazarr ingress: keep redirects relative so they aren't blocked as mixed content (#2910)

* Fix Bazarr ingress: keep redirects relative so they aren't blocked as mixed content

Opening the Bazarr panel over HTTPS failed with:

  Mixed Content: ... requested an insecure frame
  'http://<ha_host>:8099/bazarr/'. This request has been blocked

Bazarr is Flask-based and answers /bazarr (the ingress entry, which has no
trailing slash) with a redirect to /bazarr/, made absolute against the Host
nginx sends upstream -- http://127.0.0.1:6767/bazarr/. proxy_redirect's
implicit "default" rule strips that prefix, which makes nginx treat the
Location as its own; the header filter then re-absolutises it as
$scheme://$host:$server_port/... Since $host is the browser's host forwarded
by the Supervisor and $server_port is the ingress port (8099, the Supervisor
default as no ingress_port is declared), the result is a plain-http URL on a
port the browser refuses to frame from an https page.

absolute_redirect off keeps the Location relative, and the proxy_redirect
rules re-prefix it with the ingress entry so it resolves under
/api/hassio_ingress/<token>/. The second rule also covers backends that emit
an already-relative Location; external absolute redirects match neither rule
and pass through untouched.

Verified against a local nginx with a stand-in backend: the pre-fix config
reproduces http://<host>:<ingress_port>/bazarr/ exactly, and the fixed config
returns /api/hassio_ingress/<token>/bazarr/ for both absolute and relative
upstream Locations while leaving an external redirect alone.

Also fixes the fallback base_url in services.d/nginx/run, which wrote it
without the leading / and so reintroduced the startup crash fixed in 1.5.6-4.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Tighten base_url guard in nginx run script to require the leading slash

CodeRabbit review on #2910: the guard `grep -q "base_url.*$slug"` matches
both "base_url: bazarr" and "base_url: /bazarr" -- the .* swallows the slash
-- so it treated the malformed no-slash form as already correct and never
triggered the repair. Require the literal "base_url: /$slug" instead, so a
config missing the slash is actually detected and fixed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

.github/workflows/daily_ai_fix.yaml

@@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ permissions:
   contents: write
   issues: write
   pull-requests: write
-  id-token: write  # claude-code-action fetches a GitHub OIDC token to auth the OAuth flow
 
 concurrency:
   group: ai-fix-sweep
@@ -129,9 +128,16 @@ jobs:
         uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@44423bdec74b97d67543eb16c110546762c110b2  # v1
         with:
           claude_code_oauth_token: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN }}
-          # One sticky, auto-updating status comment per run instead of the
-          # model narrating its own progress in scattered comments.
-          track_progress: true
+          # Skip the OIDC -> Claude App token exchange. The scheduled path
+          # happens to pass it (github.actor is the maintainer), but
+          # workflow_dispatch by anyone else would 401. AI_PR_TOKEN, not
+          # GITHUB_TOKEN, so a PR Claude opens triggers CI.
+          github_token: ${{ secrets.AI_PR_TOKEN }}
+          # No track_progress here. It needs an issue or PR to hang its sticky
+          # comment on, and the action hard-fails validation without one; this
+          # workflow only ever runs on schedule/workflow_dispatch. Per-issue
+          # progress still gets reported — issue-fix.md has Claude comment on
+          # each issue directly via gh.
           prompt: |
             The batch of issues to work through is /tmp/ai-fix/batch.json.
             Follow .github/prompts/issue-fix.md exactly. Do not deviate from

.github/workflows/on_issue_approved.yaml

@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ permissions:
   contents: write
   issues: write
   pull-requests: write
-  id-token: write  # claude-code-action fetches a GitHub OIDC token to auth the OAuth flow
 
 concurrency:
   group: ai-approve-${{ github.event.issue.number || inputs.issue }}
@@ -139,7 +138,14 @@ jobs:
         uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@44423bdec74b97d67543eb16c110546762c110b2  # v1
         with:
           claude_code_oauth_token: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN }}
-          track_progress: true
+          # Skip the OIDC -> Claude App token exchange, which 401s whenever
+          # github.actor lacks write access. AI_PR_TOKEN, not GITHUB_TOKEN, so
+          # a PR Claude opens triggers CI.
+          github_token: ${{ secrets.AI_PR_TOKEN }}
+          # Only the `issues` path has a comment thread to track progress in.
+          # On workflow_dispatch there is none, and passing true there fails
+          # the action's input validation outright.
+          track_progress: ${{ github.event_name == 'issues' }}
           prompt: |
             The approved plan is /tmp/ai-exec/plan.md and the issue it belongs
             to is /tmp/ai-exec/issue.json. Follow .github/prompts/issue-execute-plan.md

.github/workflows/on_issues_ai_triage.yaml

@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ on:
 permissions:
   contents: read
   issues: write
-  id-token: write  # claude-code-action fetches a GitHub OIDC token to auth the OAuth flow
 
 concurrency:
   group: ai-triage-${{ github.event.issue.number || inputs.issue || github.run_id }}
@@ -148,6 +147,12 @@ jobs:
         uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@44423bdec74b97d67543eb16c110546762c110b2  # v1
         with:
           claude_code_oauth_token: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN }}
+          # Without this the action falls back to the OIDC -> Claude App token
+          # exchange, which 401s ("User does not have write access on this
+          # repository") whenever github.actor is the outside reporter who
+          # opened the issue or replied to a needs-info request. Same token the
+          # step already exports as GH_TOKEN; classify only reads.
+          github_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
           show_full_output: true
           prompt: |
             Read /tmp/ai-triage/context.md, then follow the instructions in

.github/workflows/on_pr_coderabbit.yml

@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ permissions:
   contents: write
   pull-requests: write
   issues: write
-  id-token: write  # claude-code-action fetches a GitHub OIDC token to auth the OAuth flow
 
 concurrency:
   group: ai-coderabbit-${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
@@ -83,6 +82,11 @@ jobs:
         uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@44423bdec74b97d67543eb16c110546762c110b2  # v1
         with:
           claude_code_oauth_token: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN }}
+          # Skip the OIDC -> Claude App token exchange, which 401s whenever
+          # github.actor lacks write access — here github.actor is
+          # coderabbitai[bot], the review submitter. AI_PR_TOKEN, not
+          # GITHUB_TOKEN, so the pushed fixes re-trigger CI on the PR.
+          github_token: ${{ secrets.AI_PR_TOKEN }}
           prompt: |
             CodeRabbit has reviewed pull request #${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
             on ${{ github.repository }}. You are on that PR's branch. Follow

.templates/00-global_var.sh

@@ -3,6 +3,160 @@
 
 set -e
 
+################################################################################
+# Block markers, temp helper, quoting and export-block builders
+#
+# Everything here is free of side effects and defined before the Supervisor
+# guard, so that the self-test below can exercise the whole value path outside a
+# container, where bashio is not available.
+################################################################################
+BLOCK_BEGIN="# --- BEGIN ADDON ENV (generated) ---"
+BLOCK_END="# --- END ADDON ENV (generated) ---"
+
+mktemp_safe() {
+    local tmpdir="${TMPDIR:-/tmp}"
+    mkdir -p "$tmpdir"
+    mktemp "$tmpdir/tmp.XXXXXXXXXX"
+}
+
+dotenv_quote() {
+    # For /.env and /etc/environment: double quotes + minimal escaping.
+    #
+    # These files are read back by sourcing them from a shell, so every
+    # character that is still special inside double quotes has to be escaped.
+    # $ and ` used to be left alone, which meant a value was expanded instead of
+    # being read literally: a password like pa$$w0rd came back with the shell
+    # PID spliced into it, and a value containing backticks ran as a command.
+    #
+    # Backslash must be doubled first, so that the backslashes added below are
+    # not doubled in turn.
+    local v="$1"
+    v="${v//\\/\\\\}"
+    v="${v//\"/\\\"}"
+    v="${v//\$/\\\$}"
+    v="${v//\`/\\\`}"
+    v="${v//$'\n'/\\n}"
+    v="${v//$'\r'/\\r}"
+    printf '"%s"' "$v"
+}
+
+shell_quote() {
+    # Single-quote for safe injection into shell code.
+    #
+    # Inside single quotes every character is literal, so the only thing a value
+    # needs escaping for is the quote character itself: close the quote, emit an
+    # escaped quote, reopen it. Backslashes must be left untouched.
+    #
+    # This used to double every backslash and to replace ' with '"'"' followed by
+    # a stray space. The stray space corrupted every value containing a quote
+    # (O'Brien pass arrived as O' Brien pass); the doubling was undone further
+    # down the path by the "awk -v" in append_export, so backslashes survived by
+    # accident. Both halves are fixed together -- see the note in append_export.
+    local s="$1"
+    printf "'%s'" "${s//\'/\'\\\'\'}"
+}
+
+append_export() {
+    # Plain append, deliberately not awk: "awk -v q=$value" runs the value
+    # through awk's escape processing, which turns \t into a tab, \b into a
+    # backspace and \\ into a single backslash. That used to be cancelled out by
+    # shell_quote doubling every backslash, so the two bugs hid each other --
+    # fixing only one of them corrupts the value.
+    printf 'export %s=%s\n' "$1" "$(shell_quote "$2")" >> "$EXPORT_BODY"
+}
+
+compose_export_block() {
+    {
+        echo "$BLOCK_BEGIN"
+        echo "# Generated from $JSONSOURCE"
+        cat "$EXPORT_BODY"
+        echo "$BLOCK_END"
+    } > "$EXPORT_BLOCK"
+}
+
+################################################################################
+# Self-test: bash .templates/00-global_var.sh --self-test
+#
+# Builds a real export block and sources it, which is exactly what happens once
+# the block is injected at the top of a service run script, then checks that
+# every value came back byte for byte. Testing the whole path matters: the two
+# defects this guards against (shell_quote doubling backslashes and append_export
+# passing values through "awk -v") cancelled each other out, so a test of either
+# helper alone reported success while the pair was wrong.
+#
+# Runs before the Supervisor guard and exits, so it never affects startup.
+################################################################################
+if [[ "${1:-}" == "--self-test" ]]; then
+    # Literal test data: the single quotes and metacharacters are the point.
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2016
+    self_test_values=(
+        'plain.host'
+        'next\.duckdns\.org'   # regex, dots escaped once
+        'next\\.duckdns\\.org' # regex, dots escaped twice by the user
+        'C:\Users\bob\share'   # windows path, \U and \b are awk escapes
+        '\\server\share'       # UNC path
+        'col\tsep'             # \t is an awk escape
+        "O'Brien pass"         # embedded quote
+        "it's a 'quoted' word" # several embedded quotes
+        "'leading"
+        "trailing'"
+        'a$b`c"d' # shell metacharacters
+        '*.example.com|^foo\d+$'
+        $'sp ace\ttab'
+        ''
+    )
+
+    JSONSOURCE="self-test"
+    EXPORT_BODY="$(mktemp_safe)"
+    EXPORT_BLOCK="$(mktemp_safe)"
+    self_test_env="$(mktemp_safe)"
+    trap 'rm -f "$EXPORT_BODY" "$EXPORT_BLOCK" "$self_test_env"' EXIT
+    self_test_rc=0
+
+    self_test_check() {
+        # $1 name of the variable that was read back, $2 expected value, $3 how
+        local self_test_got="${!1}"
+        [[ "$self_test_got" == "$2" ]] && return 0
+        printf 'FAIL (%s): <%s> came back as <%s>\n' "$3" "$2" "$self_test_got"
+        self_test_rc=1
+    }
+
+    # 1. The export block, sourced the way an injected run script would
+    for self_test_i in "${!self_test_values[@]}"; do
+        append_export "SELFTEST_${self_test_i}" "${self_test_values[$self_test_i]}"
+    done
+    compose_export_block
+    # shellcheck source=/dev/null
+    . "$EXPORT_BLOCK"
+    for self_test_i in "${!self_test_values[@]}"; do
+        self_test_check "SELFTEST_${self_test_i}" "${self_test_values[$self_test_i]}" "export block"
+    done
+
+    # 2. /.env, sourced the way browserless_chrome and wger read it back.
+    # Values holding a newline are out of scope: dotenv_quote writes them as a
+    # literal \n, which a dotenv parser unescapes but a shell does not.
+    for self_test_i in "${!self_test_values[@]}"; do
+        printf 'DOTENVTEST_%s=%s\n' \
+            "$self_test_i" "$(dotenv_quote "${self_test_values[$self_test_i]}")"
+    done > "$self_test_env"
+    if ! bash -n "$self_test_env"; then
+        # An unescaped backtick or quote leaves the file unparseable, which would
+        # abort the sourcing shell instead of just yielding a wrong value.
+        echo "FAIL (dotenv): generated env file is not valid shell"
+        self_test_rc=1
+    else
+        # shellcheck source=/dev/null
+        . "$self_test_env"
+        for self_test_i in "${!self_test_values[@]}"; do
+            self_test_check "DOTENVTEST_${self_test_i}" "${self_test_values[$self_test_i]}" "dotenv"
+        done
+    fi
+
+    [[ "$self_test_rc" -eq 0 ]] &&
+        echo "${#self_test_values[@]} values round-tripped unchanged (export block + dotenv)"
+    exit "$self_test_rc"
+fi
+
 ################################################################################
 # Guard: only run inside Supervisor-managed add-ons
 ################################################################################
@@ -30,15 +184,6 @@ command -v jq >/dev/null || bashio::exit.nok "jq is required"
 mkdir -p /etc
 touch "$ETC_ENV_FILE"
 
-################################################################################
-# Temp helper
-################################################################################
-mktemp_safe() {
-    local tmpdir="${TMPDIR:-/tmp}"
-    mkdir -p "$tmpdir"
-    mktemp "$tmpdir/tmp.XXXXXXXXXX"
-}
-
 ################################################################################
 # Secrets support
 ################################################################################
@@ -68,54 +213,13 @@ resolve_secret() {
     printf '%s' "$line"
 }
 
-################################################################################
-# Quoting
-################################################################################
-dotenv_quote() {
-    # For /.env and /etc/environment: double quotes + minimal escaping
-    local v="$1"
-    v="${v//\\/\\\\}"
-    v="${v//\"/\\\"}"
-    v="${v//$'\n'/\\n}"
-    v="${v//$'\r'/\\r}"
-    printf '"%s"' "$v"
-}
-
-shell_quote() {
-    # Single-quote for safe injection in shell code
-    local s="$1"
-    s="${s//\\/\\\\}"
-    s="${s//\'/\'\"\'\"\' }"
-    s="${s% }"
-    printf "'%s'" "$s"
-}
-
 ################################################################################
 # S6 + script injection block
 ################################################################################
-BLOCK_BEGIN="# --- BEGIN ADDON ENV (generated) ---"
-BLOCK_END="# --- END ADDON ENV (generated) ---"
-
 EXPORT_BLOCK="$(mktemp_safe)"
+EXPORT_BODY="$(mktemp_safe)"
 KV_FILE="$(mktemp_safe)"
-trap 'rm -f "$EXPORT_BLOCK" "$KV_FILE"' EXIT
-
-{
-    echo "$BLOCK_BEGIN"
-    echo "# Generated from $JSONSOURCE"
-    echo "$BLOCK_END"
-} > "$EXPORT_BLOCK"
-
-append_export() {
-    local k="$1" v="$2" q
-    q="$(shell_quote "$v")"
-
-    awk -v k="$k" -v q="$q" -v e="$BLOCK_END" '
-        $0==e { print "export " k "=" q }
-        { print }
-    ' "$EXPORT_BLOCK" > "$EXPORT_BLOCK.tmp"
-    mv "$EXPORT_BLOCK.tmp" "$EXPORT_BLOCK"
-}
+trap 'rm -f "$EXPORT_BLOCK" "$EXPORT_BODY" "$KV_FILE"' EXIT
 
 inject_block() {
     local f="$1" tmp
@@ -235,6 +339,8 @@ cp "$ENV_FILE" "$ETC_ENV_FILE"
 ################################################################################
 # Inject into scripts and shells (best-effort)
 ################################################################################
+compose_export_block
+
 for f in /etc/services.d/*/run /etc/s6-overlay/s6-rc.d/*/run /etc/cont-init.d/*.sh /entrypoint.sh /etc/bash.bashrc "${GLOBAL_VAR_FILES:-}"; do
     [[ -f "$f" ]] && inject_block "$f"
 done

bazarr/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
 
+## 1.6.0.1 (2026-07-27)
+
+- Fix ingress: nginx rewrote Bazarr's redirects into an absolute `http://<host>:8099/...` URL, which the browser blocked as mixed content when Home Assistant is served over HTTPS. Redirects now stay relative and point at the ingress path
+- Fix fallback base_url in the nginx service script missing its leading `/`, which crashed Bazarr on startup
+
 ## 1.6.0 (2026-07-08)
 
 - Update to latest version from linuxserver/docker-bazarr (changelog : https://github.com/linuxserver/docker-bazarr/releases)

bazarr/config.yaml

@@ -112,4 +112,4 @@ schema:
 slug: bazarr_nas
 udev: true
 url: https://github.com/alexbelgium/hassio-addons/tree/master/bazarr
-version: "1.6.0"
+version: "1.6.0.1"

bazarr/rootfs/etc/nginx/servers/ingress.conf

@@ -19,6 +19,19 @@ server {
        proxy_set_header Connection $http_connection;
        #auth_basic off;
 
+       # Adjust Location headers in backend redirects
+       # Bazarr is Flask-based and answers /bazarr with a redirect to /bazarr/,
+       # made absolute against the Host nginx sends upstream, so it reads
+       # http://127.0.0.1:6767/bazarr/. proxy_redirect strips that prefix, and
+       # nginx then re-absolutises the result as $scheme://$host:$server_port/...
+       # i.e. http://<ha_host>:8099/bazarr/ -- blocked by the browser as mixed
+       # content inside the ingress iframe. absolute_redirect off keeps it
+       # relative; the proxy_redirect rules re-prefix it with the ingress entry
+       # (the second rule also covers a redirect that was relative already).
+       absolute_redirect off; # Do not add port to redirect
+       proxy_redirect http://127.0.0.1:6767/ %%ingress_entry%%/;
+       proxy_redirect / %%ingress_entry%%/;
+
        # Correct base_url
        proxy_set_header Accept-Encoding "";
        sub_filter_once off;

bazarr/rootfs/etc/services.d/nginx/run

@@ -15,9 +15,10 @@ bashio::net.wait_for "$port" localhost 900
 if [ -f "$CONFIG_LOCATION" ]; then
     if ! bashio::config.true "ingress_disabled"; then
         if ! bashio::config.has_value "connection_mode" || [ "$(bashio::config 'connection_mode')" != "noingress_auth" ]; then
-            if ! grep -q "base_url.*$slug" "$CONFIG_LOCATION"; then
+            if ! grep -q "base_url: /$slug" "$CONFIG_LOCATION"; then
                 bashio::log.warning "BaseUrl not set properly, restarting"
-                sed -i "s/  base_url:.*/  base_url: $slug/" "$CONFIG_LOCATION"
+                # Must start with / for Flask blueprint registration
+                sed -i "s|  base_url:.*|  base_url: /$slug|" "$CONFIG_LOCATION"
                 bashio::addon.restart
             fi
         fi