Merge pull request #2823 from alexbelgium/fix/claude-desktop-startup-and-keyring

fix(claude_desktop): fix startup crash loop and persist sign-in via g…
This commit is contained in:
Alexandre
2026-07-07 13:25:38 +02:00
committed by GitHub
6 changed files with 180 additions and 4 deletions

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@@ -1,3 +1,15 @@
## 1.4 (07-07-2026)
- Persist Claude Desktop sign-in: bundle gnome-keyring/libsecret/dbus-x11 and start an unlocked Secret Service in the desktop session, and launch with --password-store=gnome-libsecret. Fixes "Your sign-in won't be saved on this device. Install and unlock a system keyring". The keyring DB lives on persistent storage (/config/data), so the session survives restarts.
## 1.3 (07-07-2026)
- Fix startup crash loop ("All subprocesses terminated. Exiting."):
- Make the Selkies desktop init oneshots (init-video, init-selkies-config) tolerant so a partially-permitted device/permission op in the HA sandbox no longer fails add-on bringup.
- Pre-create /tmp/selkies_js.log so the base image's "chmod 777 /tmp/selkies*" calls never fail on an empty glob.
- Reconcile XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to the tmpfs runtime dir instead of persistent storage.
- Run Claude Desktop with --disable-dev-shm-usage and drop the misplaced shm_size env var (Home Assistant ignores shm_size), fixing Electron renderer crashes on the default 64 MB /dev/shm.
## 1.2 (07-07-2026)
- Add baked-in git/GitHub CLI support with optional startup credential configuration.

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@@ -56,7 +56,13 @@ RUN if [ ! -f /bin/sh ] && [ -f /usr/bin/sh ]; then ln -s /usr/bin/sh /bin/sh; f
RUN curl -fsSLo /usr/share/keyrings/claude-desktop-archive-keyring.asc https://downloads.claude.ai/claude-desktop/key.asc && \
echo "deb [arch=amd64,arm64 signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/claude-desktop-archive-keyring.asc] https://downloads.claude.ai/claude-desktop/apt/stable stable main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/claude-desktop.list && \
apt-get update && \
apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends claude-desktop python3-pip git gh && \
apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
claude-desktop \
python3-pip \
gnome-keyring \
libsecret-1-0 \
dbus-x11 \
git gh && \
apt-get clean && \
rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

118
claude_desktop/SIGN_IN.md Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
# Claude Desktop sign-in — fix plan (not implemented)
Two related sign-in problems when Claude Desktop runs inside the LinuxServer Selkies
streamed desktop.
**Status:**
- **Problem B (keyring persistence) — IMPLEMENTED** in v1.4 (Dockerfile + `rootfs/defaults/autostart`).
- **Problem A (in-desktop browser for OAuth) — PLAN ONLY, intentionally not implemented.**
The image ships no browser; complete the login with the user-side workaround below.
---
## Problem A — Cannot complete login
Symptoms:
- **"Continue with Google"** does nothing.
- **"Continue with email"** sends a link that "must be opened from the same machine".
### Root cause
Claude Desktop signs in through an **external web page** (Google OAuth or the email magic
link) and then hands the token back to the app via the **`claude://` URL scheme**
(auto-registered on first launch). Both paths need:
1. a **web browser inside the streamed desktop** to render the auth page, and
2. a **default-browser association** so the app's `xdg-open <url>` call goes somewhere.
The Selkies base image ships **no browser** and no default handler, so `xdg-open` has
nothing to dispatch to → Google "does nothing", and the email link's final `claude://…`
redirect only works on the machine running the app (the container), which currently can't
render/handle it.
### Fix (image level)
In `claude_desktop/Dockerfile`, install a browser and register defaults so the whole flow
completes inside the session:
- `apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends chromium` (Debian bookworm package name;
`firefox-esr` is an alternative).
- Set the default browser and confirm the scheme handlers, e.g. as an s6 oneshot or in the
desktop `autostart` (runs as the session user with `$DISPLAY`/dbus available):
```sh
xdg-settings set default-web-browser chromium.desktop
xdg-mime default claude-desktop.desktop x-scheme-handler/claude
```
- Verifying expectations (for reference, not a test step):
`x-scheme-handler/https` → `chromium.desktop`, `x-scheme-handler/claude` →
`claude-desktop.desktop`.
Then login is done entirely in the streamed desktop: **Continue with Google** opens
Chromium in-session and the `claude://` redirect lands back in the app; or paste the email
magic link into the in-session Chromium (not a phone).
### User-side workaround (no rebuild)
- Add-on Configuration → `additional_apps: chromium`, restart (installed by
`rootfs/etc/cont-init.d/80-configuration.sh`).
- Run the two `xdg-settings`/`xdg-mime` commands once in an in-session terminal, or add them
to the custom script `/addon_configs/db21ed7f_claude-desktop/claude-desktop.sh`.
---
## Problem B — "Your sign-in won't be saved on this device"
Symptom:
> Install and unlock a system keyring (such as GNOME Keyring), then restart the app.
### Root cause
Claude Desktop (Electron) persists its auth token with `safeStorage`, which on Linux
encrypts via the **Secret Service API** (`org.freedesktop.secrets`) provided by
gnome-keyring/kwallet. The Selkies base runs only a **system** D-Bus
(`svc-dbus` → `dbus-daemon --system`) and has **no keyring daemon**, so `safeStorage` is
unavailable and the token cannot be stored → the app warns and forgets the session on
restart.
Note: the desktop itself already runs under a **session** bus —
`root/defaults/startwm.sh` launches `dbus-launch --exit-with-session openbox-session`, so
apps started from the openbox `autostart` inherit `DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS`. The keyring
must be started **inside that session** so it registers the secrets service on the same bus
Claude Desktop uses. No extra `dbus-launch` is needed.
### Fix (image level)
1. `claude_desktop/Dockerfile`: install
`gnome-keyring libsecret-1-0 dbus-x11` (dbus-x11 provides `dbus-launch`, already used by
startwm; libsecret-1-0 is the backend Electron dlopens).
2. `claude_desktop/rootfs/defaults/autostart`: start & unlock an empty-password keyring
before launching the app, and force the libsecret backend. Proposed content:
```sh
# Start + unlock a gnome-keyring secrets service so Claude Desktop can persist sign-in.
# Runs inside the openbox session's dbus (startwm.sh: dbus-launch --exit-with-session).
eval "$(printf '' | gnome-keyring-daemon --login)" 2>/dev/null || true
eval "$(gnome-keyring-daemon --start --components=secrets)" 2>/dev/null || true
dbus-update-activation-environment --all >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
claude-desktop --no-sandbox --disable-dev-shm-usage --password-store=gnome-libsecret
```
- `--login` reads the password from stdin (empty here), creating and unlocking the login
keyring on first run and starting the daemon in login mode; `--start --components=secrets`
then exposes the Secret Service and exports `GNOME_KEYRING_CONTROL`/`SSH_AUTH_SOCK`.
- `--password-store=gnome-libsecret` forces Electron to use the libsecret backend instead
of falling back to plaintext.
3. Persistence: the keyring DB lives in `$HOME/.local/share/keyrings/` and `HOME=/config/data`
(persistent add-on storage), so the empty-password login keyring survives restarts and is
re-unlocked automatically each boot by the same `autostart` line — the sign-in then sticks.
### User-side workaround (no rebuild)
- Add-on Configuration → `additional_apps: gnome-keyring, libsecret-1-0, dbus-x11`, restart.
- Add the keyring-start lines above to the custom script
`/addon_configs/db21ed7f_claude-desktop/claude-desktop.sh`, and relaunch Claude Desktop
with `--password-store=gnome-libsecret` (e.g. edit the in-session openbox autostart).
---
## Files this plan would touch (when implemented)
- `claude_desktop/Dockerfile` — install `chromium`, `gnome-keyring`, `libsecret-1-0`,
`dbus-x11`; set default browser + scheme handlers.
- `claude_desktop/rootfs/defaults/autostart` — keyring bootstrap + `--password-store` flag.
- `claude_desktop/CHANGELOG.md` / `config.yaml` version bump.
## Open questions before implementing
- Bundle **chromium** vs **firefox-esr** as the in-image browser?
- Empty-password keyring (fully unattended) vs. reuse the add-on `PASSWORD` option to lock
the keyring with the same password?

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@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ environment:
SELKIES_FRAMERATE: "30"
START_DOCKER: "false"
TITLE: Claude Desktop
shm_size: 1gb
image: ghcr.io/alexbelgium/claude_desktop-{arch}
ingress: true
init: false
@@ -79,5 +78,5 @@ slug: claude_desktop
tmpfs: true
udev: true
url: https://github.com/alexbelgium/hassio-addons
version: "1.2"
version: "1.4"
video: true

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@@ -1 +1,16 @@
claude-desktop --no-sandbox
#!/usr/bin/env sh
# Persist Claude Desktop sign-in across restarts.
# Claude Desktop (Electron) stores its auth token via safeStorage, which on Linux needs the
# Secret Service API (org.freedesktop.secrets). Provide it with gnome-keyring on the openbox
# session bus (startwm.sh runs `dbus-launch --exit-with-session`), unlocked with an empty
# password so it comes back automatically after a restart. The keyring DB lives under
# $HOME/.local/share/keyrings, and HOME=/config/data is persistent add-on storage, so the
# saved sign-in survives add-on restarts.
eval "$(gnome-keyring-daemon --start --components=secrets 2>/dev/null)" || true
printf '' | gnome-keyring-daemon --unlock 2>/dev/null || true
export GNOME_KEYRING_CONTROL SSH_AUTH_SOCK
dbus-update-activation-environment --all >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
# --password-store=gnome-libsecret forces Electron onto the libsecret backend instead of
# falling back to plaintext (and warning that the sign-in will not be saved).
claude-desktop --no-sandbox --disable-dev-shm-usage --password-store=gnome-libsecret

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@@ -70,6 +70,11 @@ mkdir -p "$LOCATION" /tmp/cache "$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR"
chmod 755 /tmp/cache
chmod 700 "$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR"
# Pre-create the Selkies joystick log so the base image's "chmod 777 /tmp/selkies*"
# calls (in init-selkies-config and svc-de) never fail on an empty glob.
touch /tmp/selkies_js.log
chmod 777 /tmp/selkies_js.log
if [ -e "$LOCATION/.cache" ] && [ ! -L "$LOCATION/.cache" ]; then
rm -rf "$LOCATION/.cache"
fi
@@ -78,3 +83,24 @@ ln -sfn /tmp/cache "$LOCATION/.cache"
bashio::log.info "Setting ownership to $PUID:$PGID"
chown -R "$PUID":"$PGID" "$LOCATION" /tmp/cache "$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR"
chmod -R 700 "$LOCATION"
# The base init-selkies-config script overrides XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to $HOME/.XDG, which lands
# on persistent storage and conflicts with the tmpfs runtime dir set above. Re-assert the
# tmpfs value at the end of that oneshot so the app and desktop agree on one valid dir.
SELKIES_CONFIG_RUN="/etc/s6-overlay/s6-rc.d/init-selkies-config/run"
if [ -f "$SELKIES_CONFIG_RUN" ] && ! grep -q 'XDG_RUNTIME_DIR override reconciled' "$SELKIES_CONFIG_RUN"; then
printf '\n# XDG_RUNTIME_DIR override reconciled\nprintf "%%s" "%s" > /run/s6/container_environment/XDG_RUNTIME_DIR\n' "$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR" >> "$SELKIES_CONFIG_RUN"
fi
# The Selkies desktop init oneshots do best-effort device/permission setup (mknod
# /dev/input/*, chmod /tmp/selkies*, /dev/dri perms) that is only partially permitted in the
# HA add-on sandbox. A non-zero exit from a oneshot fails add-on bringup and crash-loops the
# container, so make these two tolerant and always report success. Longruns (svc-*) are left
# untouched so s6 keeps supervising them with their real exit codes.
for oneshot in init-video init-selkies-config; do
run="/etc/s6-overlay/s6-rc.d/$oneshot/run"
if [ -f "$run" ] && ! grep -q '^set +e$' "$run"; then
sed -i "1a set +e" "$run"
printf '\nexit 0\n' >> "$run"
fi
done