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hassio-addons/.claude/PRIVILEGE_ANALYSIS_REPORT.md
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2025-08-02 13:28:18 +02:00

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Container Privilege Analysis Report

Generated: 2025-08-02

🔍 Executive Summary

Critical Finding: 57 out of 108 add-ons (53%) request SYS_ADMIN privileges - a system administration capability that grants near-root access within containers.

Risk Assessment: HIGH - The widespread use of SYS_ADMIN significantly increases the attack surface and potential for container escapes.

📊 Privilege Usage Statistics

  • Total Add-ons: 108
  • Add-ons with Privileges: 60 (55%)
  • SYS_ADMIN Usage: 57 add-ons (53%)
  • NET_ADMIN Usage: 9 add-ons (8%)
  • DAC_OVERRIDE Usage: 0 add-ons (0%)

🚨 Top 5 Critical Add-ons Analysis

1. Filebrowser (8,427 installations)

Privileges: SYS_ADMIN, DAC_READ_SEARCH
Device Access: Extensive - All storage devices (sda-sdg, nvme, partitions)
Purpose: Web-based file management interface

Analysis:

  • Over-privileged: SYS_ADMIN likely not needed for file browsing
  • Excessive device access: Requests access to ALL possible storage devices
  • ⚠️ Security risk: File manager with admin privileges = potential data exfiltration
  • 🔧 Alternative: Use bind mounts with specific directories instead of SYS_ADMIN

Justification Score: 2/10 - Very weak justification

2. Nextcloud (Cloud Storage)

Privileges: SYS_ADMIN, DAC_READ_SEARCH
Device Access: All storage and video devices
Purpose: Personal cloud storage and collaboration platform

Analysis:

  • ⚠️ Potentially justified: May need filesystem operations for cloud storage
  • Excessive device access: Duplicate device entries in config
  • 🔧 Alternative: Use specific capabilities like CHOWN, FOWNER instead of SYS_ADMIN
  • ⚠️ Security concern: Cloud platform with admin access to all devices

Justification Score: 4/10 - Weak justification, alternatives exist

3. Plex NAS (Media Server)

Privileges: SYS_ADMIN, DAC_READ_SEARCH
Device Access: Storage + DVB TV tuners + video hardware
Purpose: Media server with hardware transcoding

Analysis:

  • ⚠️ Partially justified: Hardware transcoding may require device access
  • SYS_ADMIN overkill: Could use DEVICE_CONTROL for hardware access
  • Host networking: Appropriate for media server discovery
  • 🔧 Alternative: More specific device capabilities

Justification Score: 5/10 - Moderate justification, refinement needed

4. Arpspoof (Network Blocker)

Privileges: SYS_ADMIN, DAC_READ_SEARCH
Device Access: All storage devices (unnecessary)
Purpose: Block internet connection for local network devices

Analysis:

  • Justified for function: ARP spoofing requires network manipulation
  • Wrong capabilities: Should use NET_ADMIN + NET_RAW, not SYS_ADMIN
  • Inappropriate device access: Doesn't need storage device access
  • 🔧 Alternative: NET_ADMIN + NET_RAW capabilities only

Justification Score: 3/10 - Wrong privilege type used

5. Radarr (Movie Management)

Privileges: SYS_ADMIN, DAC_READ_SEARCH
Device Access: All storage devices
Purpose: Movie collection management (downloads, organization)

Analysis:

  • Not justified: File management doesn't require SYS_ADMIN
  • Over-privileged: Basic file operations don't need admin rights
  • 🔧 Alternative: Standard file permissions with proper user mapping
  • ⚠️ Security risk: Download manager with admin privileges

Justification Score: 1/10 - No justification

🔧 Privilege Reduction Recommendations

Immediate Actions (Week 1)

1. Filebrowser - Remove SYS_ADMIN

"privileged": [
    "DAC_READ_SEARCH"  // Keep for file access
],
"devices": [
    "/dev/fuse"  // Only FUSE if needed
    // Remove all storage devices, use bind mounts instead
]

2. Radarr/Sonarr/Bazarr - Remove SYS_ADMIN

"privileged": [
    "DAC_READ_SEARCH"  // Only for reading file attributes
],
"devices": []  // Remove all device access

3. Arpspoof - Fix Privilege Type

"privileged": [
    "NET_ADMIN",      // For network manipulation
    "NET_RAW"         // For raw socket access
],
"devices": []         // Remove storage device access

Medium-term Actions (Week 2-4)

4. Nextcloud - Reduce Privileges

"privileged": [
    "CHOWN",          // For file ownership changes
    "FOWNER",         // For file permission changes
    "DAC_READ_SEARCH" // For file access
],
// Remove duplicate device entries

5. Plex - Specific Hardware Access

"privileged": [
    "DAC_READ_SEARCH"  // For media file access
],
"devices": [
    "/dev/dri",        // GPU for transcoding
    "/dev/dvb/",       // TV tuners only
    // Remove storage devices, use bind mounts
]

📋 Category-Based Privilege Guidelines

Media Applications (Plex, Emby, Jellyfin, Radarr, Sonarr)

Standard Privileges: DAC_READ_SEARCH only
Device Access: GPU devices for transcoding only
Justification: Media management requires file reading, not system administration

File Managers (Filebrowser, Nextcloud)

Standard Privileges: DAC_READ_SEARCH, optionally CHOWN/FOWNER
Device Access: None - use bind mounts
Justification: File operations can be handled through proper volume mounting

Network Tools (Arpspoof)

Standard Privileges: NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW
Device Access: Network interfaces only
Justification: Network manipulation requires network capabilities, not system admin

Development Tools (Code-server, Gitea)

Standard Privileges: Minimal - consider rootless containers
Device Access: None
Justification: Development tools should not require elevated privileges

🎯 Implementation Roadmap

Phase 1: Critical Risk Reduction (Week 1)

  • Remove SYS_ADMIN from Filebrowser
  • Remove SYS_ADMIN from Radarr, Sonarr, Bazarr
  • Fix Arpspoof privilege types
  • Test functionality with reduced privileges

Phase 2: Systematic Review (Week 2-3)

  • Review all 57 SYS_ADMIN usage instances
  • Create privilege justification documentation for each
  • Implement alternatives for 80% of cases

Phase 3: Documentation & Prevention (Week 4)

  • Update CONTRIBUTING.md with privilege guidelines
  • Add privilege justification requirements to PR template
  • Implement automated privilege checking in CI/CD

📈 Success Metrics

  • Target: Reduce SYS_ADMIN usage from 57 to <15 add-ons
  • Timeline: 4 weeks
  • Verification: Automated testing with reduced privileges
  • Documentation: 100% of remaining SYS_ADMIN usage documented and justified

🛡️ Security Impact

Before: 53% of add-ons with near-root container access
After: <14% of add-ons with justified elevated privileges
Risk Reduction: ~70% reduction in high-privilege containers
Attack Surface: Significantly reduced container escape vectors


Next Review: 2025-09-02 (Monitor privilege usage trends and compliance)

This analysis demonstrates that the majority of SYS_ADMIN usage in this repository is unnecessary and represents a significant security risk that can be mitigated through proper container security practices.